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ABSTRACT
In the 1969 landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the Supreme Court reassured students that they do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Ever since then, the
exact scope of students’ free speech rights has been unclear, but the high court has used
Tinker’s substantial disruption test to clarify its scope in successive legal challenges. In
2017, B. L., a Mahanoy Area School District student, was suspended from her cheerleading
team after using vulgar language off-campus that made its way back to her coaches. She
challenged the decision in the courts, and when her case reached the Court of Appeals, the
Third Circuit declined to use Tinker’s test in its decision, instead ruling that Tinker
categorically does not apply to any off-campus speech. The Third Circuit’s argument that
courts should use a bright-line rule in applying Tinker to off-campus speech is a
compelling one. This Comment evaluates the substance of the Third Circuit’s decision,
describes the Supreme Court’s eventual retort, and discusses why the Supreme Court’s
ruling fails millions of public school students and their families. While the Supreme Court
vindicated B. L., students suffer without clear guidance regarding student free speech
rights.
Keywords: free speech, students, Mahanoy, Supreme Court, Tinker, First Amendment,
public schools, social media, school discipline, off-campus speech, substantial disruption
test, Third Circuit, cheerleader case
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
B. L., now known as Brandi Levy, was a rising sophomore in high school when she
was passed over for the varsity cheerleading squad and instead placed on the junior varsity
squad for another year.1 In her place, the coaches named an incoming first-year to the
varsity squad.2 Certainly, this was a frustrating turn of events for Levy.3 So, she did what
many young people might in her situation: she blew off some steam on social media.4
About 250 of Levy’s closest friends and acquaintances received a photo, or “snap,” from
her on Snapchat featuring Levy and her friend, middle fingers in the air, with the words
“fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything” superimposed over the picture.5
Another snap came through giving context to the picture, expressing general frustration
about her and another student remaining on the JV squad another year. Notably, none of
the snaps explicitly mentioned the school’s name.6
The snap disappeared after twenty-four hours, but her peers’ reaction to Levy’s
profane message only grew.7 A fellow cheerleader screenshotted the message and showed
it to one of the cheerleading coaches.8 Several students asked the coaches about Levy’s
snaps.9 The coaches determined that Levy’s snap violated policy and school rules, and they

1

B. L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2020).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 175–76.
8
Id. at 175.
9
Id. at 175–76.
2
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removed her from the squad, telling her she could try out again next year.10 Levy’s parents
appealed the decision at several levels within the school system, all the way up to the
superintendent; each administrator supported the school’s decision to suspend Levy.11
Levy’s parents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, alleging that Levy had been deprived of her constitutional rights and
specifically claiming that Levy’s suspension from the cheer squad violated the First
Amendment.12 The district court granted summary judgment to Levy on her First
Amendment claim, the Mahanoy Area School District appealed and, in response, the Third
Circuit issued an explosive opinion in which it ruled that Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District should not be used to evaluate Levy’s off-campus speech.13
This decision spurred the Supreme Court to grant the school district’s writ of certiorari.14
After the Court heard oral argument, it issued a groundbreaking 8-1 ruling in favor of Levy,
acknowledging that Levy’s speech did not warrant punishment by the Mahanoy Area
School District while attempting to salvage the power of schools and authorities to sanction
unwanted behavior.15
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief history of the exceptions the Supreme
Court has created in the wake of landmark school free speech case Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District. Part II will provide the Third Circuit’s history of
student free speech case law which led to its surprising decision to locate all off-campus
student speech outside of Tinker’s reach in Levy’s case. Then, in Part III, this Comment
will analyze B. L. ex rel Levy. v. Mahanoy Area School District, the Third Circuit’s 2020
decision. This Comment will explain the Third Circuit’s reasoning in its decision to grant
students free speech rights coextensive with those of adults for off-campus speech and
review the Third Circuit’s analysis of other circuit approaches, illuminating the split
between circuits. Part IV will focus on the Supreme Court’s ruling, whether its rejection of
the Third Circuit’s approach still offers a satisfactory rule for defining off-campus speech
within the purview of school discipline, and the legal implications of applying the Supreme
Court ruling for students and schools.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”16 However, before Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District was decided in 1969, common law doctrine dictated that students in public
schools were under the authority of their teachers and administrators of the school they
attended because the schools stood in loco parentis, or in the role of the parent.17 That
meant they had parent-like authority to discipline students and keep order in classrooms
10

Id. at 176.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 176–77.
14
Id.; Granted & Noted List, October Term 2020 Cases for Argument as of July 2, 2021, THE SUP. CT.
(July 29, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/20grantednotedlist.pdf.
15
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. ex rel Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (2021).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 3.
17
Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 271–
76 (1986).
11
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and schools.18 The Vietnam War and ensuing protests in public schools brought a new
student free speech doctrine to the Supreme Court. After the Tinker decision, the Supreme
Court heard several successive free speech court challenges, each of which have informed
the student free speech landscape.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In 1969, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District cemented the limited free speech rights of students for
generations to come, holding that a student’s right to free speech is protected unless that
student “substantially” disrupts the operation of a school.19 Here, a “substantial” disruption
is so pervasive that it interferes with a school official’s ability to discipline a student or
maintain order in the school environment.20 While the Court has carved out a number of
exceptions in the intervening decades, Tinker’s landmark ruling has controlled the student
free speech landscape for the fifty years since it was decided.21
Tinker involved high school students who silently protested the Vietnam War by
wearing black armbands at their school.22 The school punished the students by suspending
them until they agreed to stop wearing the armbands at school.23 The students filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the students’ punishment violated their First
Amendment rights.24 They sought nominal damages and an injunction to stop the school
district from disciplining the students.25 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.26 After granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court reversed that decision in a victory for the students.27
The Court’s review spawned the famous line penned by Justice Fortas for the
majority that “it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”28
Importantly, however, Justice Fortas also cautioned that student rights are not without their
limits.29 The Court granted that students could still be punished for their speech by school
administrators if the speech “materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”30 This standard has become known
as the “substantial disruption” test, and remains key to understanding Tinker and its

18

Id.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
20
Id. at 505, 509, 513.
21
See Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and Student Free Speech: A Retrospective Look at Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District and Its Progeny, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 189, 191
(2020).
22
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504–05.
23
Id. at 504.
24
Id. at 504–05.
25
Id. at 504.
26
Id. at 504–05.
27
Id. at 514.
28
Id. at 506.
29
Id. at 507, 509.
30
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
19
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applicability to student free speech cases.31 However, the “substantial disruption” test has
limitations.32 The school should not discipline students for disruptions causing only
awkwardness or unpleasantness, but should only take action on actual substantive
disruption or speech that the school can reasonably expect will cause a substantial
disruption.33 The students’ armbands were a passive form of protest, a form of speech that
did not itself interrupt class, “entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive
conduct by those participating in it,”34 and the Court found that the students’ speech did
not cause a substantial disruption.35
B. Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser
In 1986, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bethel School District Number 403 v.
Fraser once again shifted the school free speech landscape.36 There, the Court created
another carve-out to the student free speech rights enumerated in Tinker.37 Instead of using
the substantial disruption test set forth in Tinker to guide its decision, the Court considered
the school’s particular interest in prohibiting vulgar speech to “teach[] students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”38
In Fraser, a high school student gave a speech at an assembly nominating a fellow
student for the student government, and in the process, utilized several double entendres to
give the speech sexualized meaning in an attempt at humor.39 School policy prohibited
“[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”40 The Court
overturned both the district court and the Ninth Circuit, determining that the speech at issue
in Fraser was unlike the speech protected in Tinker because it combined non-political
origins with inappropriate content.41 Taken altogether, the Court concluded that the balance
of interests tilted in favor of the school’s latitude to discipline students for profane language
and gestures.42
The Court held that even under the First Amendment, schools can still prohibit the
use of “lewd and indecent language” in a non-political context “during a school-sponsored
activity” to protect minors from inappropriate behavior and educate them about “the shared
values of a civilized social order.”43 Because Fraser’s speech was both non-political in its
joking support for a classmate and plainly vulgar, the Court found that disciplining Fraser
with a three-day suspension was “entirely within [the school’s] permissible authority.”44
31

Allison N. Sweeney, The Trouble with Tinker: An Examination of Student Free Speech Rights in the
Digital Age, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359, 389 n.189 (2019).
32
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 505.
35
Id. at 514.
36
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 675 (1986).
37
Id. at 686–87.
38
Id. at 681.
39
Id. at 678.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 680–81.
42
Id. at 681.
43
Id. at 679–80.
44
Id. at 676, 685.
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C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years later, another student free speech case presented itself to the Supreme
Court.45 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the school principal deemed two pages
of the school newspaper too controversial to publish and ordered them removed from the
resulting final copy.46 The two pages at issue included stories that discussed student
pregnancies and student impact from parental divorce.47 Because the principal wanted to
avoid delaying the last newspaper issue of the year, the principal ordered the two offending
pages removed from publication.48
Students and staff members of the school newspaper filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 seeking a declaration from the court that the paper was a free speech forum fully
protected by the First Amendment.49 The district court held for the school, and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision, holding for the students.50 The
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning relied in part on the conclusion that the school newspaper was
a public forum, and as such, could not be censored by the school unless such censorship
fell under Tinker’s substantial disruption test.51 The Court of Appeals saw no foreseeable
chance that the censored articles would have materially or substantially disrupted the
school’s operation.52
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, concluding instead that the school
newspaper was not a forum for public expression. Specifically, the Supreme Court pointed
out that the school newspaper’s facilities were not “open for indiscriminate use by the
general public”53 but were instead “reserved for other intended purposes.”54 The Court
asserted that the school newspaper, as fully funded by the Board of Education and as part
of the school’s educational curriculum, was not a public forum but rather a “supervised
learning experience for journalism students.”55
As a result, the Court concluded the school had the right to assert its authority over
the content of school-sponsored publications “so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”56 Educators have authority over these and
“other expressive activities . . . so long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants” because they are
“part of the school curriculum.”57 The Court’s ruling in Hazelwood created yet another
framework separate from Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test for school officials to curate
the speech inside schools.58 Specifically, Hazelwood established that administrators have
45

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988).
Id. at 263–64.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 264–65; Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
50
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265–66.
51
Id. at 265.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
54
Id. at 267.
55
Id. at 270.
56
Id. at 273.
57
Id. at 271.
58
Id.
46
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the right to not “promote particular student speech” notwithstanding the First Amendment
when that speech arises from “expressive activities . . . that the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”59
D. Morse v. Frederick
The most recent Supreme Court case that shaped student free speech precedent was
Morse v. Frederick, commonly known as the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case. 60 The
controversial speech in Morse occurred off-campus, as students were attending a parade
on the street adjacent to the school as a school-authorized field trip during school hours.61
The event had press accompanying it, and as the parade passed, Frederick, a high school
student, and his friends, also students, brandished a fourteen-foot-long banner with the
phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” on it for the TV cameras to capture.62 When Frederick
refused to put down the banner, Principal Morse suspended him for ten days, citing a
Juneau School Board Policy that prohibited all public expression favoring illegal drugs.63
Frederick appealed the suspension, but the superintendent upheld it.64 The superintendent
noted that, similar to the circumstances of Fraser, Frederick had not engaged in political
speech.65 Frederick was not agitating for the legalization of marijuana, but had merely
promoted illegal drugs.66 Doing so was “clearly disruptive of . . . the school’s educational
mission.”67
Frederick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages, a declaration that his
speech was protected, and an injunction against the punishment.68 The district court granted
summary judgment for Morse, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.69
The Ninth Circuit found that Frederick was entitled to the protections afforded by the
Tinker “substantial disruption” test and that Morse and the school board had failed to
establish that Frederick’s banner met that test.70 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
Frederick’s First Amendment right to display the banner was “clearly established.”71
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling by clarifying that Frederick
did not have the right under the First Amendment to hold the banner.72 Chief Justice
Roberts explained that Morse’s interpretation of the banner as potentially promoting illegal
drug use was reasonable, remarking that the phrase could be taken as advising others to
“[[t]ake] bong hits,” or as reveling in drug use, e.g., “[we take] bong hits.”73 He further
explained that, regardless of Frederick’s asserted motive for creating and displaying the
59

Id.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
61
Id. at 397.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 398.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 398–99.
68
Id. at 399.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 399–400.
72
Id. at 400.
73
Id. at 402.
60
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banner—that he and his friends wanted to get on television—the meaning of the banner
itself could reasonably be taken as promoting illegal drug use.74 In disagreement with the
Ninth Circuit, he reasoned that this motive even lent support to the presumption that his
speech was non-political.75
Roberts established that Frederick’s speech was non-political, promoted illegal drug
use, and was performed at a school-authorized field trip. With these facts in mind, Chief
Justice Roberts ran through the carve-outs established by the Court in Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood.76 Roberts recalled the Court’s treatment of student rights in the Fourth
Amendment context, emphasizing that while students have constitutional rights, “the
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.”77 He then cited to
Congress’s stated legislative priorities to make schools a critical resource for educating
students and counseling them against illegal drug use, finding that the school board policy
reflected these legislative priorities.78 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that since students’
rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults outside a school context, and since
curtailing illegal drug use is an urgent legislative priority, censoring student speech that
can be reasonably understood to promote drug use is acceptable under Tinker’s
acknowledgment of the “special characteristics of the school environment.”79
Morse v. Frederick was decided on these narrow grounds, and Chief Justice Roberts
declined to broaden this ruling to declare the speech “plainly ‘offensive’” under Fraser,
remarking that to do so would be to “stretch[] Fraser too far.”80 As a result, public school
students, their parents, school district officials, and even legislators are now left with a
patchwork of rules and standards from which to construct their constitutional rights in a
school setting. In Morse—a case where the student conducted his speech off-campus—the
Court failed to clarify the status of all student speech that occurs off-campus, instead
choosing to narrowly focus its ruling on off-campus speech that occurs in the context of a
school-sponsored activity.81
In the absence of such clarification, lower courts have advanced several lines of
reasoning for when schools can and cannot punish speech in K-12 public schools.82 Most
find that Tinker applies, but disagree about the kinds of speech punishable under the
“substantial disruption” test.83 While the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that speech
punished in both Fraser and Hazelwood would not have been punished if the speech
occurred off-campus, the lack of explicit guidance on the applicability of Tinker, Fraser,
Hazelwood and Morse to off-campus speech leaves courts, administrations, state
governments, parents, and most importantly, students in the dark about the extent to which
the First Amendment protects off-campus student speech.84
74

Id.
Id. at 402–03.
76
Id. at 403–07; see supra Part I.
77
Id. at 406 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995)).
78
Id. at 408.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 409.
81
Sweeney, supra note 31, at 387–88.
82
Id. at 388.
83
Id. at 388–89.
84
Ashley Waddoups, Schools to Students: Post That, and You Won’t Play: When Schools Condition
Students’ Participation in Extracurricular Activities on Appropriate Social Media Use, 2019 BYU L. REV.
75
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Confusion has only intensified in the online era about the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to clarify the scope of student speech rights.85 Social media’s reach has
blurred the boundaries of “campus,” especially when controversial content is created
entirely off-campus.86 Only the Third Circuit has sketched out case law that styles offcampus student speech as comprehensively protected under the First Amendment.87 The
Third Circuit’s recent decision in B. L. was made possible only through a good deal of
judicial experimentation via several landmark appellate cases. The following section lays
out some of that case history.
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO STUDENT SPEECH
In two cases decided together in 2011, the Third Circuit held that student speech offcampus involving the creation of fake social media profiles that lampooned school
administrators was protected under the First Amendment.88 In these two cases, the Third
Circuit set the stage for its analysis in B. L. by setting new limitations for schools and
administrators with regard to off-campus student speech. The cases delineated a new
category of protected student speech: offensive or vulgar speech created off-campus that
happened to find its way onto school grounds.
A. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, Layshock created a
“parody profile” of his high school principal on MySpace in 2005.89 He filled the profile
with fake, puerile, and humiliating information, and the profile inspired several other
copycat fakes, each more vulgar than Layshock’s.90 Layshock accessed the MySpace
profile at school, as did other students in the computer lab, and because of the technology
coordinator’s unavailability, computer programming classes were cancelled for five days
until Christmas break to limit student access to these fake profiles while on school
grounds.91
Layshock admitted to creating the fake profile and apologized to the principal.92 The
next month, he was called in for an informal hearing, and the school district found him
guilty of a laundry list of transgressions, including “[d]isruption of the normal school
process; Disrespect; Harassment of a school administrator via computer/internet with
remarks that have demeaning implications; Gross misbehavior; Obscene, vulgar and
profane language; [and] Computer Policy violations (use of school pictures without
839, 844–45 (2019) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
85
See generally Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd. 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Layshock ex rel.
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
86
Id.
87
See generally B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc);
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
88
See Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; J.S., 650 F.3d 915.
89
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08.
90
Id. at 208–09.
91
Id. at 209.
92
Id.
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authorization).”93 The school suspended Layshock for ten days, placed him in alternative
education, banned him from participating in all extracurricular activities and his class
graduation, and considered expelling him from the school.94 None of the other fake profile
creators were punished.95 As a result of this unfair treatment, Layshock’s parents filed suit
under § 1983 in federal court, arguing that the First Amendment protected his speech.96
The district court granted summary judgment to the Layshocks on their First Amendment
claim, and the school district appealed.97
Since the district court found that the school district could not prove that Layshock’s
behavior fell under the Tinker “substantial disruption” test, and the school district did not
appeal this finding, the Third Circuit’s opinion focused on the school district’s attempt to
create a “sufficient nexus” between Layshock’s alleged activities and the school district.98
Had the school found a sufficient nexus, Layshock’s activities would have been punishable
under the Tinker carve-out for vulgarity created under Fraser.99 However, the school
district’s sufficient nexus argument relied on the fact that Layshock accessed the school
district’s website and downloaded a photo of his principal to post on the fake profile.100 In
2022, this argument, on its face, strains credulity because the owner of a smartphone might
copy and save pictures from the internet several times a day with no thought given to who
owns the picture (unless it’s an NFT). Even in 2011, the court easily dismissed it as
“unpersuasive at best.”101
The Third Circuit pointed the school district to Thomas v. Board of Education, a 1979
Second Circuit decision finding no sufficient relation between a school and its students’
creation of an off-campus publication: “[the fact] [t]hat a few articles were transcribed on
school typewriters, and that the finished product was secretly and unobtrusively stored in
a teacher’s closet do not alter the fact that [the magazine] was conceived, executed, and
distributed outside the school.”102 Concluding that the allegedly sufficient nexus in
Layshock was even less substantive than in Thomas, the Third Circuit rejected the school
district’s argument.103 The court concluded that it would be dangerous to allow the state to
“reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can
control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”104
The school district also argued that the speech should be considered “on-campus”
because it was “aimed at the School District community and the Principal and was accessed
on campus by [Layshock] . . . [so i]t was reasonably foreseeable that the profile would”
arouse the attentions of the school district.105 To justify this argument, the school district
cited several cases where a school was allowed to punish a student for offensive speech

93

Id.
Id. at 209–10.
95
Id. at 210.
96
Id. at 211.
97
Id. at 211.
98
Id. at 214.
99
Id. at 214–16.
100
Id. at 214.
101
Id. at 215.
102
Id. at 215 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)).
103
Id. at 216.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 214.
94
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online.106 However, the cases that the school district relied upon all fell under Tinker’s
“substantive disruption” test, with threats of violence in two cases and a student who riled
up her classmates to protest the cancellation of a school activity in another.107 As a result,
the court concluded that a school might punish expression outside of school “under certain
very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”108 The court added that Fraser
would not have supported the school district’s claim at any rate since Chief Justice Roberts
said Fraser’s speech would have been protected off-campus in Morse.109 The Third
Circuit’s decision to identify Layshock’s actions as taking place off-campus is not without
its critics, given that the profile was accessed at school.110 This fact at least arguably created
the possibility for a substantial disruption under Tinker.111
B. J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District
The Third Circuit case decided in tandem with Layshock, J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain School District, was extremely similar to Layshock. Here, a student created a
fake profile of a principal, the creator was found out, and the creator received a ten-day
suspension.112 However, the connection between the student and the school was even more
attenuated since the profile was not accessible from the school.113 In J.S., the student took
steps to make the fake profile private, and there were only a few connections between the
school and the profile: another student brought in a printed copy of the profile at the
principal’s request, there were mere nominal disruptions in class, and there were nominal
disruptions to a counselor’s appointments (since the disciplinary meeting with J.S. required
the presence of a counselor).114
In J.S., the district court found that Fraser and Morse applied since the language at
issue was “vulgar, lewd, and potentially illegal speech that had an effect on campus . . .
even though it arguably did not cause a substantial disruption of the school.”115 The Third
Circuit disposed of this argument by assuming Tinker applied to J.S.’s speech and running
it through the “substantial disruption” test.116 It concluded that the speech did not meet that
bar and that the “narrow exceptions” of the rule, including Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse,
did not apply here.117 Specifically, the Third Circuit recognized that Fraser governs speech
in school, Hazelwood governs school-sponsored speech, and Morse governs behavior “that
could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use” at a school-approved field
trip.118 Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Chagares pointed out that all of these issues
106
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were distinguishable from those in J.S.119 The court reasoned that the case does not
generate any reasonable forecast of “substantial disruption” and compared the school’s
reaction to the “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” that Tinker warns
against.120 Consequently, the Third Circuit soundly rebuffed the school district’s attempts
to liken the fake profile to cases where students were disciplined for off-campus threats of
violence and for protests disrupting the campus.121
Importantly, the Third Circuit explicitly rejected the school district and district
court’s contention that the speech fell under the Fraser exception to Tinker for vulgar and
lewd speech.122 The Third Circuit set a threshold question for applying Fraser: did the
speech occur on campus?123 Finding that the speech happened off-campus outside school
hours, the Third Circuit concluded that Fraser could not apply,124 foreshadowing its ruling
in the B. L. case.125
C. Dueling Concurrences in Layshock and J.S.
In a set of dueling concurrences in Layshock and J.S., respectively, Judges Jordan
and Smith traded visions of a future Supreme Court ruling on the issue of whether Tinker
is applicable to off-campus speech.126 In the Layshock concurrence, Judge Jordan, joined
by one other judge, expressed his frustration that the J.S. concurrence leaves the future of
Tinker as applied to off-campus speech in doubt.127 In contrast, Judge Jordan leaned on the
language of Tinker itself, where the Tinker Court said “conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.”128 By citing this language in Tinker, Judge Jordan
expressed that Tinker specifically allowed for school officials to punish student speech,
even off-campus.129 He reasoned that the Third Circuit’s decision here sidestepped this
issue, leaving the door open for future decisions to ignore this language in Tinker and
overturn precedent.130
In the above quote from Tinker, the Supreme Court used the cf. signal asking readers
to compare the situation presented in Tinker to Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of
Education, a Fifth Circuit case from 1966.131 In Blackwell, students were suspended for
refusing to remove freedom buttons that they wore around school for the purpose of
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conveying a political message.132 Upon receiving their suspensions, the students collected
some buttons from a bus driver who was distributing them, and threw them into the school
building through the windows.133 This was an act conducted on school property; it was an
act of defiance executed fully on-campus, though not within the boundaries of the
classroom.134 Nothing in the facts of Blackwell supposes that off-campus conduct was the
objectionable conduct that would have fallen under the guidance provided in Tinker.135 If
the case offers a useful analogy, “in class or out of it” was referring to both the armbands
and freedom buttons in Tinker and Blackwell—wearing political accessories on-campus,
whether inside the four corners of the classroom or not, as a form of silent, peaceful
protest.136 Were the “in class or out of it” statement made in a vacuum, Judge Jordan’s
reliance on that language would carry more weight. However, since the Supreme Court’s
signal cite intends to draw an analogy from Blackwell, where no off-campus activity
occurred, “in class or out of it” should perhaps not be read to include fully off-campus,
after-hours speech.137
Judge Jordan added that the J.S. concurrence embraces an artificial on-campus/offcampus distinction because of the ubiquity of smart technology that often accompanies
both teachers and students to school.138 He wrote that Tinker’s guidance “balance[s] the
need for order in our public schools with respect for free speech” and because of this, courts
should be applying and not avoiding its test.139 Judge Jordan further asserted that reliance
on property lines to obscure the balancing of interests fails at the task set forth by Tinker.140
The Tinker test functions to clarify the Court’s balancing of the free speech rights of
students with the compelling interests of educators in maintaining an orderly learning
environment, and sidestepping the test because of a perfunctory distinction between onand off-campus missed the point.
Judge Jordan then focused on the effect of the speech in question. Citing Schenck v.
United States’s famous pronouncement that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,” he asked
why we would accept such a result were the troublemaker to be standing just off campus
property and directing disruption into the school via technology.141 Finally, Judge Jordan
closed by reminding the reader of Saxe v. State College Area School District, another Third
Circuit decision which declared that, “if a school can point to a well-founded expectation
of disruption,” then a student’s speech may fall under Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
test.142
On the other hand, the concurrence in J.S., joined by four other judges of the en banc
court, entertained the possibility that Tinker may not apply at all to off-campus speech.143
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If Tinker did not apply to this speech, the First Amendment would protect students’ offcampus speech coextensively with that of adult “citizens in the community at large.”144
Judge Smith, writing for the concurrence, noted that courts already agree that Tinker’s
carve-outs in Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse only apply to on-campus speech (and in
Morse’s case, to school-sponsored events). The concurrence pointed out that the Tinker
decision relies on “the special characteristics of the school environment” to underscore the
need for speech restrictions,145 and Judge Smith sought additional support from post-Tinker
cases in the Second and Fifth Circuit to support this point.146
The concurrence then asked the thornier question: what constitutes “on-campus” or
“off-campus” speech in the modern age?147 Here, Judge Smith agreed with Judge Jordan’s
Layshock concurrence more than it may have led us to believe: Judge Smith’s J.S.
concurrence “would have no difficulty applying Tinker . . . where a student sent a disruptive
email to school faculty from his home computer.”148 The J.S. concurrence suggests that the
Third Circuit’s approach recommends expanding the public’s working definition of “oncampus” to include speech that is intentionally directed at a school.149 Judge Smith raised
a distinction between speech intentionally directed at campus and speech that “foreseeably
makes its way onto campus,” to avoid being overbroad and encapsulating off-campus
speech that discusses school subjects.150 In any case, the concurrence claimed that the facts
at issue before the Third Circuit did not require exploring this distinction, given that it was
“perfectly clear” that J.S.’s speech was off-campus.151 Against the backdrop of these cases
and the opinions that accompanied them, the Third Circuit decided in B. L. ex rel Levy v.
Mahanoy Area School District that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.
III. B. L. EX REL LEVY V. MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT AND OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
In an opinion by Judge Krause, the Third Circuit categorically stated in B. L. ex rel
Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District that Levy could not be punished for her off-campus
speech because Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.152 The Third Circuit built on
its discussion of off-campus student speech in the Layshock and J.S. decisions and,
understanding the importance of clarity to further the discussion on student free speech,
chose to create a bright-line rule protecting all off-campus student speech under the First
Amendment. To better understand the Supreme Court’s reaction to this opinion, it is
important to understand the evolution of the Third Circuit’s view that Tinker does not apply
144
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to off-campus speech.153 Understanding the B. L. decision requires examination of the two
main issues in B. L.154
A. Determining Whether Levy’s Speech Was On Campus
First, the Third Circuit cited J.S. for the proposition that a student’s First Amendment
rights “‘are coextensive with [those] of an adult’s’ outside [the school] context.”155 The
court then reviewed the “line” between on-campus and off-campus speech, a line that,
recalling the previous section, courts and judges alike appeared wary to define.156 After
acknowledging that the line cannot merely be drawn at the classroom’s or even at the
school’s brick-and-mortar boundaries, this court reflected on how Morse, Hazelwood, and
Fraser all dealt with speech that was either school-sponsored or otherwise schoolcontrolled.157 This analysis focused on the forum of control for the speech itself rather than
the effect of the speech.158 The Third Circuit then cited to its own appeal to absurdity from
Layshock against the school reaching into a family’s home to punish speech there.159 Of
course, in the age of remote learning amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Third Circuit’s
pronouncement rings a bit hollow. Similarly hollow is the echo of Judge Smith’s J.S.
concurrence confidently predicting that the court would have no problem punishing the
speech in a student’s inflammatory email sent to school administrators.160
The Third Circuit acknowledged that defining the line between on- and off-campus
is increasingly difficult given society’s oversaturation with social media.161 However, it
forged ahead with an analysis based on two Supreme Court cases concerning the unique
intersection of the internet and First Amendment rights: Reno v. ACLU and Packingham v.
North Carolina.162 In both cases, Judge Krause observed, the Supreme Court was reluctant
to use a heavy hand in creating novel legal theories to vindicate First Amendment
concerns.163 Instead, she noted, the Court applied existing doctrines and settled precedent
to the novel challenges that digital communication and censorship present.164 She argued
that the Third Circuit should use the same method here.165
Next, the decision took the Circuit’s prior holdings in J.S. and Layshock and
compared them to Thomas and Porter—two decisions created in the “analog era” before
the internet—to characterize the Third Circuit decisions as a natural extension of already
existing doctrine.166 Recalling Thomas, the 1979 underground newspaper case, the Second
153
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Circuit characterized the speech of the newspaper as off-campus speech subject to more
expansive protection under the First Amendment because most of the work to produce and
distribute the newspaper was intentionally done off-campus.167 While some of the
newspapers had incidental contact with the school, the students intentionally kept the lion’s
share of the work related to the newspaper—including its distribution—off-campus, and
so the speech was deemed to be off-campus.168 Porter involved a disturbing and graphic
drawing that a student made of his school being attacked that his brother inadvertently
brought to campus years later.169 The Fifth Circuit held in 2004 that the speech was “neither
speech directed at the campus nor a purposefully communicated true threat,” and was
therefore entitled to First Amendment protection outside of Tinker’s guidance.170
What the Third Circuit pulled from these two cases was something of a balancing
test.171 Levy’s speech was physically off-campus, outside of school hours, “without school
resources,” and on a social media platform unconnected with the school. Given all of these
circumstances and referring back to J.S. and Layshock, the Third Circuit concluded that
mere mention of the school combined with indirect reach of the speech into the school were
not enough to overcome those facts.172 However, the Third Circuit’s decision not to
explicitly articulate a balancing test was deliberate; a footnote indicated that the court chose
not to direct future courts on how to define the on/off-campus distinction—a decision the
court called an act of “judicial restraint.”173
B. Can a School Punish a Student for Off-Campus Speech?
Having laid to rest the controversy over whether the speech was off-campus, the
court then addressed the second issue: whether Levy’s punishment for her speech could be
justified under Tinker, Fraser, or another approach.174 The Third Circuit swept aside the
school district’s attempt to argue that the speech was punishable under Fraser because the
speech involved the use of an extracurricular school activity to “graft an extracurricular
distinction onto our case law.”175 The opinion additionally noted that using Fourth
Amendment and due process case law is inappropriate in the First Amendment context
because “[t]he First Amendment . . . abhors ‘ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits,’” and the First Amendment does not require that claimants show that their interest
in free speech outweighs countervailing governmental interests in punishing speech.176
Judge Krause concluded that, since Levy’s speech was beyond the reach of the school’s
167
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control, it did not matter what the punishment was or if she was involved in an
extracurricular activity; it only mattered that she was punished at all when her speech fell
under the protection of the First Amendment.177
Next, the court responded to the school’s argument that, under Tinker, Levy’s snap
was likely to fall under the “substantial disruption” test.178 The court reiterated the Third
Circuit’s holding that the offending snap “took place beyond the ‘school context’” based
on where, when, on which platform the speech was uttered, and whether school resources
were used in uttering it.179 Since the appellant argued that Tinker applied and that the
“substantial disruption” test was met, the court had no choice but to face the issue it had
previously ducked. To avoid deciding it under the assumption that Tinker applied, the court
would have had to acknowledge and take a position regarding other unresolved
constitutional disputes involving the “substantial disruption” test’s application to the
extracurricular context.180 Additionally, without clarity at the appellate level, district courts
failed to coalesce around a unified approach to these questions in the years since J.S. and
Layshock—years that have cemented the ubiquity of social media and constant digital
connectedness, leaving the scope of student free speech rights in a digital world unclear
and in chaos.181
C. Examining Alternative Circuit Approaches
For that reason, the Third Circuit examined the approaches other circuits had taken
before rejecting them in turn.182 First, it examined the “reasonably foreseeable” approach,
where courts should apply Tinker when it is “reasonably foreseeable that a student’s offcampus speech would reach the school environment.”183 This approach began with two
cases involving threats of violence,184 but expanded beyond that to cases of harassment,185
and finally, to cases involving neither threats of violence nor harassment.186 Next, it
detailed the “sufficient nexus” test, where courts apply Tinker to off-campus speech if the
speech has “a sufficient ‘nexus’ to the school’s ‘pedagogical interests.’”187 This approach
has mainly been used in cases to combat cyberbullying and harassment between
students.188 Lastly, it examined how some circuits have applied Tinker to off-campus
speech without articulating a standard.189
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However, the Third Circuit reasoned that even though other circuit courts adopted
these standards with good intentions (e.g., to prevent a threat of violence, or a student from
bullying another student), they had done so in a reactionary way that inadvertently
incorporated too much speech for the original boundaries of Tinker’s test.190 The court
reasoned that these precedential cases should only serve as “a narrow accommodation of
unusually strong interests on the school’s side.”191
The Third Circuit considered that living in a society where high schoolers share their
speech on social media platforms does not necessitate that courts ought to shrink from
applying the robust Supreme Court First Amendment precedents set in Reno and
Packingham.192 Indeed, digital connectedness demands that courts do so in the face of
potential regulatory capture of protected speech.193 As an example, the Third Circuit
considered the hypothetical of a student who writes a blog post on the weekend at home
about their teachers’ competency and then shares that post with one of their many social
media networks.194 This hypothetical demonstrates the difference between the school
context, where standing up in class and talking about teachers’ competence would be
inappropriate, and “beyond the school context,” where this student is writing from, even if
the blog post reaches the audience of students and administrators.195
The court’s problem with the “sufficient nexus” test is that it is tautological—finding
a nexus here means designating speech that would “interfere with the work and discipline
of the school.”196 However, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test is already exactly that,
since the point of the underlying approach is to help the public understand what speech
constitutes a substantial disruption to schools.197 To assert a tautological test in order to
ignore the existence of a line between on- and off-campus speech is, in the Third Circuit’s
view, a dangerous overreach.198 What is more, such a highly pragmatic, non-standardized
approach fails for unpredictability.199 A lack of clarity on what the law is and how it is
applied when it comes to student free speech rights can chill speech for students, teachers,
and school administrators.200
The Third Circuit panel’s chosen standard is that Tinker does not apply to off-campus
speech.201 The court defined “off-campus speech” as speech that is “outside school-owned,
-operated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the
school’s imprimatur.”202 It reasoned that Judge Smith’s (now Chief Judge Smith’s)
concurrence in J.S. laid the groundwork for this conclusion.203 The court was undeterred
by “[r]ecent technological changes,” claiming that those changes strengthened the
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conclusion that off-campus speech is, on the whole, outside Tinker’s reach.204 Faced with
the choice of allowing administrators to punish both on- and off-campus student speech
when they deem it necessary, and narrowly tailoring the boundaries of those interests to
on-campus speech, Judge Krause chose the latter.205 She concluded that the former
“sacrific[es] precious freedoms that the First Amendment protects.”206 This conclusion also
offered the clarity that prior decisions lacked, allowing students to fully enjoy their free
speech rights under the law and allowing schools to understand the boundaries of their
ability to punish speech.207
Lastly, the majority attempted to address some concerns with this conclusion. The
first was raised by Judge Ambro’s concurrence in this decision, which speculated that
confusion may yet reign in an instance where speech that is clearly off-campus creates
substantial disruption inside a school context.208 The majority, hoping to preempt the
concurrence’s concern, claimed in response that school officials still have the authority to
punish the speech of any student reacting to that off-campus speech in a disruptive manner
while on campus.209 The court likened online off-campus speech that schools might be
eager to punish to a student making a controversial protest sign and displaying it in a public
place, saying that there would be no mistake that a school could not punish such speech
were it in the park.210 The court also deferred judgment on future cases involving threats
of violence and harassment, suggesting that there could be an alternative remedy for
schools in such cases by designating such speech as “true threat[s]” if the government or
schools can meet strict scrutiny exceptions to First Amendment protection.211 The court
maintained that, even if its holding places some unfortunate speech beyond the regulatory
authority of schools, the sacrifice is necessary to maintain the expansive freedoms of the
First Amendment.212
In response, Judge Ambro’s concurrence urged the majority to kick the can down the
road on the constitutional question of whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech and
reminded his fellow jurists that not even Levy thought this question needed to be decided
to reach a conclusion in this case. The concurrence noted that sister circuits in the Second
and Fifth Circuits whose cases the majority relies on in Thomas and Porter have since
decided closer cases based on other standards.213 Judge Ambro thought that because there
was clearly no “substantial disruption” that ensued in the school as a result of Levy’s snap,
it was unnecessary to reach the question of whether Tinker applies in an off-campus
context; whether it did or not, the court’s conclusion would be the same.214 According to
the concurrence, the court’s definition of “off-campus” with regard to “school-owned, -
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operated, or -supervised channels[]” does not provide clear guidance on how such channels
might be defined.215
Of course, much of the problem related to a lack of definitional clarity spawns from
the fact that B. L. was not a close case; there was no hint of “substantial disruption” from
the Tinker test, and therefore no need to apply Tinker in the first place.216 Judge Ambro
concluded that, since other circuits have decided much tougher cases than this one without
drawing the conclusion that off-campus speech does not fall under Tinker, it was not
appropriate for the majority to do so either, offering the advice, “[d]o not decide today what
can be decided tomorrow, for tomorrow it may not need to be decided.”217 The Third
Circuit’s strong standard in favor of protecting student speech brings to mind the J.S.
concurrence’s breezy assurance that, if a student sent an inflammatory email to school
administrators from their personal computer, it would be swept into the on-campus
category.218 For example, would a student emailing a school employee’s work email
address be enough to bring the student’s speech inside “school-owned/-operated
channels”? The Third Circuit’s decision in B. L. left this question unanswered, perhaps in
the hope that the Supreme Court would answer it for students’ benefit. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court failed to provide crucial clarity with regard to the on- and off-campus
distinction and its importance to the off-campus student speech analysis.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT RULING
Two months after the Third Circuit handed down its decision in B. L., the Mahanoy
Area School District petitioned for certiorari before the Supreme Court,219 and the Court
granted the school district’s petition.220 The ACLU of Pennsylvania served as counsel for
Levy. The high court heard arguments from Levy and the Mahanoy Area School District,
and then three months later handed down its decision: Levy’s speech was not substantially
disruptive and so fell outside Tinker’s reach.221 However, Justice Breyer’s decision
articulated more than just a decision on Levy’s speech; it also denounced the Third
Circuit’s bright-line rule and articulated a need for nuance with regard to online student
free speech.222
A. The Court’s New Test: It Depends
The Supreme Court declined to draw the bright line proposed by the Third Circuit in
its decision.223 Justice Breyer recounted that, while the majority panel went out on a limb
to exclude off-campus speech from Tinker’s purview, Judge Ambro’s concurring opinion
215
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(see Section III.B, supra) pointed out that, by Tinker’s own test, Levy’s speech was not
substantially disruptive, and so the court need not have reached the question of whether
Tinker’s test should apply.224 Justice Breyer thus sidestepped the debate about what
constitutes on-campus or off-campus speech and rejected the Third Circuit’s strong stance
on excluding off-campus speech from the Tinker test.225 While the Court ruled that Levy’s
speech was not punishable by the school, on the topic of the actual question presented—
whether Tinker’s test applies to student speech occurring off-campus—Justice Breyer’s
answer was to repeat, in so many words, the old adage: it depends.226
Justice Breyer’s rejection of the Third Circuit’s stance relied on the practical
considerations presented by the parties to the case and by interested parties in amici
briefs.227 The Court agreed with the school district and others that situations involving
bullying and harassment, threats aimed at others in the school environment, and breaches
of rules regarding schoolwork that occur off-campus because of computer learning or other
circumstances were all among valid reasons to avoid categorical exclusion of off-campus
speech from the Tinker test.228 Justice Breyer emphasized that not only have the school and
learning environments rapidly changed with the introduction of computers and learning
over the Internet, but the off-campus activities that may fall under the Tinker test might
also depend on the student’s age, or on the school, among other factors.229 It would be
unwise to impose a singular bright-line rule for such a foundational issue in a constantly
changing social and developmental environment.
In recognition of these considerations, Justice Breyer instead articulated a framework
to which a feature test can be applied in order to assess school interests in regulating or
curtailing speech.230 These three features, as they apply to the off-campus speech in
question, support a weaker nexus between the speech and the school’s interest in regulating
it.231 First, Justice Breyer highlighted that generally, off-campus speech falls within the
domain of parental responsibility, which relieves the school of its role to stand in loco
parentis, or in the role of the parent.232 Second, he observed that if schools have the
unmitigated right to regulate off-campus speech along with on-campus speech, that
composes the totality of a student’s speech.233 Skepticism in regulating off-campus speech
is therefore necessary to avoid the result that a student may be entirely curtailed from
unregulated speech.234 Justice Breyer noted that, of the classes of student speech, political
and religious speech ought to face the highest threshold for regulation off-campus.235 Third,
Justice Breyer stated that the schools that angle to regulate student speech actually have an
interest in protecting unpopular speech, and that protecting unpopular ideas, especially
when the student’s unpopular ideas are expressed off-campus, is fundamental to student
224
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understanding of our democracy.236 The Court noted that these are three features of offcampus speech that distinguish it from on-campus speech and that they create a weaker
case for schools to regulate the questionable speech.237
Justice Breyer declined to give any kind of threshold for these features’ strength to
qualify speech as protected under the First Amendment.238 He also explicitly punted the
issue of whether a student’s location off-campus can “make the critical difference” for
student speech protection, but noted that in a future case, this case would serve as an
example.239
B. Levy’s Speech
With regard to Levy’s speech in particular, the Court agreed with the Third Circuit
that her speech is protected by the First Amendment.240 Justice Breyer wrote that Levy was
engaging in criticism of the rules of her community when she posted the offending snap.241
Levy’s “criticism did not involve features that would place it outside the First
Amendment’s ordinary protection.”242 The speech involved neither fighting words nor
obscenity as defined in Cohen v. California.243
Next, Justice Breyer applied the features he had articulated to assess the validity and
importance of the school district’s interests against Levy’s speech interests. He concluded
that the school’s interest should not prevail on the basis of the three separate, but
complementary, reasons.244 First, Levy spoke on her own time, off-campus, using her
personal technology, to a private audience.245 This weakens the school’s interest in
educating Levy by teaching good manners and discouraging the use of vulgar language
because the school is presumably not standing in the role of the parents while she is at a
convenience store using her phone on the weekend.246 Second, since the speech was offcampus, the Court should be skeptical of its regulation unless it squarely fit the bill of
Tinker’s substantial disruption test. The Court did not find that the minor disruption that
followed Levy’s speech inside the school met Tinker’s “demanding” standard for a
“substantial disruption.”247 Third, Justice Breyer dismissed the coaches’ rationale for
suspending Levy, one of whom said that it was not for any specific impact but simply
because the “negativity” in Levy’s speech “could impact students in the school.”248 Tinker
236
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made clear that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension” is not enough to meet the standard
to curtail First Amendment right to speech.249 This speech is not punishable simply because
its unpopularity resulted in generalized negativity.
This short opinion concluded with a pointed call-out to the Third Circuit’s decision,
where Justice Breyer noted that the Court does not agree with it; rather, it agreed with the
Third Circuit concurrence, which cited similar reasons for ruling in favor of Levy to those
of the Court here.250
C. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito, who joined the 8–1 majority, also wrote a concurring opinion where he
focused on developing a more concrete framework to analyze potential regulation of offcampus student speech.251 His analysis began with an interesting question: why should
public school teachers and administrators have an authority, even limited, to curtail student
speech in a way that private school teachers and administrators do not?252 His answer was
that parents consent to the dimunition of their child’s speech rights by enrolling the child
in a public school; this line of reasoning is the basis of the in loco parentis theory.253 Alito
looked to history, where at one extreme teachers and administrators at a boarding school
stood fully in loco parentis, and at the other homeschooled children were entirely within
the scope of their parents’ care.254 Given that students attend school for part of the day,
Justice Alito viewed administrative authority to regulate student speech as correlative with
students’ presence in an environment where the teacher or administrator has supervisory
control over the student.255 In that same light, he emphasized that such supervision is only
part-time, and that parents’ decision to send a child to public school does not equal a waiver
of their authority over their children.256
Armed with this understanding, Justice Alito used the question of whether parents in
this situation “can reasonably be understood to have delegated to the school the authority
to regulate the speech in question” as a distinction for difficult cases in which
administrators may try to regulate off-campus student speech.257 Using this question, he
easily distinguished some instances where parents have clearly delegated regulatory
authority to school faculty and staff (like speech during online school instruction, field
trips, and extracurricular activities), from instances where the speech clearly falls under
First Amendment protection (like off-campus speech related to public issues, including
politics and religion).258 Even if a school tried to claim that such speech was the cause of a
substantial disruption to classroom activities, it could not punish the student for engaging
in the latter speech, as it is unreasonable to believe that parents would relinquish their
child’s right to engage in this speech off-campus by enrolling the student in a public
249
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school.259 While Justice Alito acknowledged that the hardest cases come when criticism
evolves into hurtful speech toward students, faculty, staff, and administrators, and threats
against the same, he did not offer a clear solution for determining those cases.260 He only
concluded that Levy’s case is not one; her speech was merely crude off-campus criticism
of school programs, which clearly falls under the category of First Amendment protection
that her parents would not reasonably have inferred they were relinquishing when enrolling
Levy in school.261
D. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas, alone in dissent, wrote a brief defense of schools’ historical broad
latitude in action when standing in loco parentis and accused the majority of ignoring
history and precedent in its rush to triangulate a solution.262 He argued that the Court ought
to adhere to a series of cases stemming from an 1859 Vermont Supreme Court decision
where a teacher was vindicated in whipping a student because the student called him names
to other students while at home within earshot of the teacher.263 Justice Thomas made clear
that courts ought to use the Lander test of judging the “effect of speech, not its location,”
and speculated that if the Court took the doctrine of in loco parentis seriously, schools
could have more, not less, control over student speech, since social media can magnify the
effect of the speech.264 While Justice Thomas’s dissent makes for an interesting example
of the Court’s somewhat arbitrary and tenuous respect for stare decisis, it has no bearing
on the result.
E. The Importance of Safeguarding First Amendment Rights
Both the Supreme Court majority and the concurrence were content to allow lower
courts the flexibility to determine whether off-campus student speech falls under First
Amendment protection on a case-by-case basis, regardless of the guiding principle for
which each jurist advocated. The B. L. case was unusual in that the punishment levied on
Levy was unrelated to a foundational and persistent point of controversy in the First
Amendment case law. However, because the Third Circuit’s ruling and the question
presented, in the Supreme Court’s eyes, wrongly implicated that controversy, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the issue regardless.
Unfortunately, this series of events led to a Supreme Court decision that merely
created negative space. This decision primarily repudiated the Third Circuit decision, but
it failed to articulate a definitive alternative for addressing the regulation of off-campus
student speech. Additionally, the majority opinion sidestepped giving any guidance
regarding the modern distinction between on- and off-campus speech, while still
contending that courts should give students First Amendment leeway when speech is offcampus.
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The analysis upon which the majority opinion rests remains confused so long as it
relies on an unclear definition of terms. Justice Breyer waffled on whether it matters that
offending speech was off-campus throughout the opinion, but still took care to admonish
the Third Circuit for daring to step out on a limb and create a bright-line rule.265 First
Amendment rights are some of the most important rights Americans have. It is, quite
literally, the very first amendment to the Constitution that “Congress shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech.”266 It is critical to safeguard and clarify those rights at
every available juncture. When the Supreme Court declines to clarify and safeguard civil
rights of people in America outside of the already clearly delineated contexts provided by
the Court to limit those rights, everyone suffers.
The Supreme Court owed students, parents, and American residents clarity, at a
minimum, to ensure the continued protection of one of their most fundamental rights.
Instead, Justice Breyer’s mushy attempt at judicial restraint empowers lower courts to
legislate policy within tiny court fiefdoms, resulting in continued inconsistency among
circuits. This circuit split "resolution" resolves nothing and will continue to cultivate
confusion under the cover of evaluating student speech on a case-by-case basis. The “test”
Justice Breyer provides is not even so strong as a factor test or a balancing test. Rather, it
is a mere “features” test, which only serves to give individual jurists more power over
students. Justice Breyer’s considerations are so vague as to provide cover for any line of
reasoning a judge may desire to pursue on a whim. This decision serves more as a lever for
increasing judicial influence than as a sound judicial ruling.
Justice Alito attempted to shape an alternative framework around which to analyze
whether schools can regulate off-campus student speech without relying on the on-/offcampus distinction. However, the concurrence was not the controlling opinion. The
majority stated that because the speech was off-campus, the First Amendment was more
likely to protect the speech, but whiffed on defining the on-/off-campus distinction. Given
multiple opportunities to clarify a segment of case law fraught with confusion which has
the potential to conflict with many established laws,267 the highest Court failed to provide
clarity in Morse, and failed to provide clarity in B. L. as well.
CONCLUSION
Faced with law that created confusion and discord,268 the Third Circuit offered
definitive answers to the thorny questions surrounding off-campus student speech, which
it likely hoped would encourage the Supreme Court to take up the issue.269 While the Third
Circuit’s approach offered clarity with its bright-line rule, Justice Breyer and an 8-1
majority rejected its reasoning, citing the need for practical nuance in determining whether
schools can regulate off-campus student speech.270
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The school district, in its petitioner’s brief, took the opportunity to characterize the
Third Circuit’s approach as an irresponsible and untenable one, given the questions it left
open for school districts within the Third Circuit and across the country.271 However, the
Supreme Court’s decision serves students no better than the Third Circuit’s does schools.
While the majority’s ruling preserves power for both administrators and jurists, it remains
an open question whether the flexibility granted here will effectively protect the First
Amendment rights of students in difficult cases. The vague “features” test outlined and
employed by Justice Breyer may serve as no more than a fig leaf in schools’ attempts to
retain the authority to regulate student speech. However, lest we forget, most importantly
for Brandi Levy, her “superfluous” off-campus student speech will serve as an example of
what remains outside Tinker’s reach.272
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